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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of participating in a military alliance on the nexus
between defence spending and economic growth. In particular, we study how the process
of gradual association to a military organization inuences the defence spending of new-
comers, and consequently their economic growth. Conclusions from the theoretical model
are tested empirically for countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Results
show that the prospect of intensied military alliance partnership and membership has a
positive e¤ect on economic growth. In addition, increased security and stability gained by
closer military cooperation reinforces the positive link with economic growth. Empirical
evidence supports theoretical priors.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between defence spending and economic growth has been widely studied in
the literature, both from theoretical and empirical points of view (Dunne et al., 2005). Results
are inconclusive and many of the traditional empirical studies nd that military spending is
not a signicant factor in explaining economic growth (dAgostino et al., 2017). The usual
explanation is that defence spending is not productive, in contrast to investment in infrastruc-
ture, research and development, or education, and does not a¤ect output directly (Korkmaz,
2015). However, conicts and lack of security are considered as obstacles to economic develop-
ment (Töngür and Elveren, 2012). Security of population and private property is essential for
good functioning of markets and also promote investment and innovation. Defence spending
provides security against internal and external threats inducing positive externalities for the
military spending and growth relationship (Musayev, 2013). Furthermore, the e¤ects of a na-
tions defence spending on growth could be a¤ected by the level of development (Alptekin and
Levine, 2012), the defence expenditure of neighbour nations or alliance membership (Macnair
et al., 1995).
The economic theory of alliances focuses on burden sharing, in which the large, rich ally
shoulders the defence burden of the small, poor allies by providing the latter with a relatively
free ride (Olson, 1965 and Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Yet, alliances can be more than aggre-
gations of military power: explicit set of rules that prescribe behavioural roles and constraint
activity (Wallander, 2000). Actually, formal alliances are social institutions that involve exten-
sive interactions. They produce subsidiary agreements which are likely to exert a more lasting
inuence on the attitudes and behaviour of each member (Walt, 1997) and may survive the
threats that had given rise to them (Kim, 2015). Accordingly, defence alliances have increas-
ingly turned to peacekeeping and peace enforcement with the end of the Cold War, requiring a
degree of integration and cooperation never experienced before. This new scenario has renewed
the interest on military institutions (Sandler and Hartley, 2001) and its implications not only
for defence burden sharing but also for alliance institutional design and stability.
La Porta et al. (1997) show the important role of institutional environment and regulations
on the behaviour of economic agents. Their work implies that the existence of a solid and reliable
institutional environment can boost countriess economic growth. Supranational legislation may
serve as a further impulse to accelerate investment and technological development. In this line,
Callado et al. (2016) show how a participation in an economic and monetary union grants
an institutional stimulus for additional technological development of newcomers. Moreover,
in an increasingly globalised world, growth rates of individual countries do not only depend
on their own characteristics, such as defence spending or infrastructure, but they seem to be
critically related to the income levels and growth rates of their trading partners, usually their
neighbouring countries (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). In this regard, Callado et al.
(2013) show that developing countries may benet from free trade agreements with developed
ones by gradually adopting their more developed nancial systems and consequently improve the
performance of their economies. With respect to defence, formal alliances, as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), have the potential to promote common defence, development of
new technologies and capabilities to adapt to the new strategic environment (Ruíz, 2014).
2
The existence of a sound and reliable institutional environment could clearly increase security.
However, the e¤ect of the integration into a military institution on the economy has not been
studied within the defence spending economic growth relationship. We attempt to make a
contribution in this line.
This paper analyses how the integration into a military alliance and the inuence of the
military institutional agreements and the newmilitary status can a¤ect the relationship between
defence spending and economic growth. To set up a theoretical model in the context of a military
institution we introduce the membership in a military alliance into the models of Shieh (2002)
and Pieroni (2009). If a country chooses to integrate into a military alliance, common defence
policy insures higher level of security. This should be benecial for the economic stability
and consequently for growth. On the other hand, membership in a military institution may
a¤ect the defence spending of all alliance components, and thereupon the output of all parties
involved. This e¤ect may have a negative impact under certain conditions. In the empirical
part we study the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was born
at the outset of the Cold War, designed to meet three complementary objectives: deter Soviet
expansionism, prevent the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North
American presence at the continent, and encourage European political integration. Although its
core function lay in the collective defence of Central andWestern Europe against a Soviet attack,
the alliance was also intended to build peace and security among its members as democratic
countries (Kugler, 1998). Along the Cold War, NATO developed procedures and mechanisms
to implement its military policy that proved to be useful for a broad range of missions beyond
deterrence and defence and allow the alliance to adapt to a new security environment after the
Cold War (Wallander, 2000).
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union forced NATO and
its member states to adapt. This evolution has a¤ected NATOs membership; its role in the
complex system of interlocking European institutions and the developing of new partnerships
with other countries. This enlargement process is a natural experiment that allows us to analyse
how the process of entering a military alliance (considering both the role of new institutions
together with the security benets from that integration) may impact economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we outline some information
about NATO related to our research. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Empirical
analysis is performed in section 4. Relationships obtained in the empirical exercise are discussed
in section 5. Final remarks are summarised in section 6.
2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
An alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more
states (Walt, 1997). NATO was established trough the Washington Treaty in 1949. Its main
mission was to build peace and security among its members as democratic countries (Wallander,
2000). From the very beginning, the alliance had a double commitment as stated in article 4
(peace and security) and article 5 (collective defence).
This double objective along with the development of formal decision-making procedures,
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subsidiary agreements and supporting bureaucracy has led NATO to become a social institu-
tion that involves extensive interactions between member-states (Walt, 1997). These political
mechanisms have proven useful in di¤erent circumstances such as civil emergency planning or
science cooperation. They allow to decide how to address them and to implement decisions
once they had been made (Wallander, 2000) and they help to explain NATO endurance and
enlargement in the aftermath of the Cold War.
The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process. Since the Alliance
was created in 1949, its membership has grown from the 12 founding members to todays 28
members through six rounds of enlargement in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004 and 2009. The
rst three rounds of enlargement which brought in Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany
(1955) and Spain (1982) took place during the Cold War, when strategic considerations were
at the forefront of decision-making.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 signalled the end of the Cold War and was
followed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The
reunication of Germany in October 1990 brought the territory of the former East Germany
into the Alliance. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to guarantee
their freedom by becoming integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. In this scenario NATO
adopted a new strategic doctrine that calls for crisis management and peace enforcement in
places even outside of Europe whenever NATOs vital interests could be at risk. This new
strategy inspired the enlargement process and the development of structured partnerships.
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were the rst former members of the Warsaw
Pact to join NATO in 1999. At the same time, the Alliance designed an institutional framework
to become a member. Namely, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched. The rst
step to become a member of NATO is to declare an interest in joining the alliance. Countries
are invited to engage in an intensied political dialogue with NATO about their membership
aspirations and related reforms. Aspirant countries may then be invited to participate in the
Membership Action Plan (MAP) to prepare and demonstrate their ability to meet obligations
and commitments of future membership. MAP is reviewed every year by the Annual National
Plan.
Countries seeking NATO membership would have to be able to demonstrate that they have
fullled the following requirements: i) a functioning democratic political system based on a mar-
ket economy, ii) the fair treatment of minority populations, iii) a commitment to the peaceful
resolution of conicts, iv) the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO
operations and v) a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional struc-
tures. Once admitted, new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations
of membership. This would include acceptance, at the time when they join, of all the princi-
ples, policies and procedures previously adopted by Alliance members (NATO, 2015a). Among
them, standardization agreements play an important role (STANAG). Member states need to
share a common set of standards, especially among military forces, to carry out multinational
operations. In particular, NATO standardization is the development and implementation of
concepts, doctrines and procedures to achieve and maintain the required levels of compati-
bility, interchangeability or commonality needed to achieve interoperability. Standardization
a¤ects the operational, procedural, material and administrative elds. This standardization
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allows for more e¢ cient use of resources and thus enhances the Alliances operational e¤ective-
ness (NATO, 2015b). Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
which joined NATO in 2004 conform the fth round of enlargement. All seven countries had
participated in the MAP.
Along with the enlargement rounds, NATO has developed a number of partnership tools
and mechanisms to support cooperation with partner countries through a mix of policies, pro-
grammes, action plans and other arrangements. Many tools are focused on the important
priorities of interoperability and building capabilities, and supporting defence and security-
related reform. Partnerships with countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean,
Gulf region, as well as individual relationships with other partners such as Japan or Australia
have been developed and adapted to the new defence and security challenges. Yet, relations
with North-Atlantic countries continue to be more intense.
Accordingly, the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) was established in 1994. The purpose
of the Partnership for Peace was to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build
strengthened security relationships between NATO and non-member countries in the Euro-
Atlantic area based on a commitment to democratic principles. The PfP enabled participants
to develop an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation,
and the level and pace of progress. In 1995 the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) was
launched to enhance interoperability and capabilities of partner forces that could be made
available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations. The PARP also
served as a planning tool to guide and measure progress in defence and military transformation
and modernisation e¤orts. Countries that wish to join NATO must participate in the PARP
as a pre-requisite to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP).
Moreover, Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) are open to countries that have the
political will and ability to deepen their relationship with NATO. Partners periodically review
their IPAPs and eventually move from this mechanism to the MAP through the development
of Annual National Programmes.
Over time, the PARP has developed in several ways in order to serve di¤erent purposes. Fol-
lowing the review of NATOs partnerships policy in April 2011, participation was also opened
to all other partners on a voluntary and case-by-case basis. In addition to improving inter-
operability and increasing transparency, the Alliance also uses the PARP to support reform
e¤orts.
Along this period, all partners have increased relationships with NATO in a very broad range
of security-related areas and can participate in over 1,000 activities o¤ered in the Partnership
Cooperation Menu pursuing a high level of cooperation with NATO in particular in the area of
defence reform and capacity building.1 Further, partners contribute in many ways to shaping
discussions and debates in the Alliance (NATO, 2014).
Figure 1 displays the countries included in the sample and the evolution of their relationship
with the alliance.
1There has been a signicant downsizing of defence budgets among most NATO allies with the exception
of Greece and Turkey, although there is no evidence of disproportionate burden sharing (at least during the
nineties), Sandler and Murdoch (2000).
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[insert Figure 1 here]
3 Theoretical Model
As stated before, we are interested in the e¤ect that a military alliance partnership and mem-
bership has on growth. Alliance partnership, and in particular, alliance membership should
come along with relevant benets of common security. If no relationship is established, the to-
tal amount of military spending is determined by own funds devoted by each individual country.
If a country is somehow associated to an alliance, such as NATO, military spending will be
a¤ected by the rules, procedures and structure of the alliance that will merge their resources
and military know-how together with the ones provided by each country.2
Let us consider an economy populated by innitely lived identical households. Households
maximize their discounted utility function over the stream of consumption ct and security
(national defence) st
1P
t=0
t

c1 t   1
1   +  S(st)

(1)
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor,  > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution,  is the weight agents assign to national security and the function S() is increasing
in security.
Government spending gt is productive, as in Barro (1990). We assume the production
function to have the Cobb-Douglass form, similar to Pieroni (2009),
yt = Atk
1 " 
t n
"
t
 
m1 t M

t

where yt is output per capita at time t, At is the productivity level at time t, kt is the physical
capital per capita, nt is non-military spending per capita,mt is military spending per capita and
Mt is the total alliance military spending per total of the alliance inhabitants (it provides the
measure of military spending of all countries involved in the relation). The elasticities of output
with respect to non-military spending and military spending are " and ; 0 < " < 1; 0 <  < 1;
respectively. Parameter ; 0 <  < 1; characterizes the weight the alliance military spending
has in the national production, i.e. the spillovers from the alliance membership.
Government spending gt is considered to take two forms: military spending, mt and non-
military spending, nt. In each period a fraction t of government spending is devoted to the
military spending
mt = t gt
and the rest to the non-military one
nt = (1  t) gt:
2It is considered that alliance membership would mean a standardisation of military spending to comply
with the norms laid down by the alliance. For example, the NATO Connected Forces Initiative that combines
a comprehensive education, training, exercise and evaluation program with the use of cutting-edge technol-
ogy to enhance the high level of interconnectedness and ensure that Allied forces remain prepared to engage
cooperatively in the future.
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Military spending is necessary for providing security. Higher security increases agentswelfare.
Security is further enhanced by military alliance membership. Production of national security
is specied as
st = BtMt
where Bt is the e¢ ciency at which military spending is turned into national security and Mt
is the total alliance military spending per capita in the analyzed economy.3 ;4 If a country
becomes involved in a relationship with the alliance, its military spending may be modied.
The following expression reects convergence to the standardlevel of military spending
mt+1 = (
   1) [(1  )mt + Mt] +mt (2)
where  is the balanced growth path growth rate of our economy, ; 0 <  < 1; measures the
speed of convergence. In this case the fraction of government spending which goes to military
spending will be a¤ected by the relationship with the alliance
t = (mt;Mt):
Government nances its spending by taxing output at a rate  t
gt =  t Atk
1 " 
t n
"
t
 
m1 t M

t

: (3)
Households enter a given period with capital kt: They distribute their income between
consumption ct and investment it: Capital depreciates at a rate  and investment is given by
it = kt+1   (1  )kt:
Households spend their disposable income on consumption and investment, and their budget
constraint can be written as
ct + kt+1   (1  )kt = (1   t)Atk1 " t n"t
 
m1 t M

t

: (4)
The ratio of government spending to physical capital can be expressed from (3) as
gt
kt
= ( tAt)
1
1 " (1 ) (1  t)
"
1 " (1 ) 

1 " (1 )
t

Mt
kt
 
1 " (1 )
: (5)
3The total alliance military spending may be represented by the stock of arms available in the whole alliance.
If a country has low number of inhabitants the available stock of arms will be large. This reects the fact that a
small country will benet more from alliance membership in case of a conict: according to one of the strategic
links, NATO members will always assist each other against attacks (NATO, 2010).
4Notice the di¤erence between Mt (total alliance military spending per capita in the analyzed country),
Mt (total alliance military spending per all alliance inhabitants) and mt (military spending per capita in the
analyzed country).
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Maximizing the household utility (1) with respect to the budget constraint (4), using (5), we
get the following expression for the growth rate of consumption
t =
ct+1
ct
=



(1  "  ) (1   t+1) 
"+
1 " (1 )
t+1 A
1
1 " (1 )
t+1 (6)
 
1  t+1
 "
1 " (1 )
 
t+1
 
1 " (1 )

Mt
kt
 
1 " (1 )
+ 1  
#) 1

:
Using the householdsbudget constraint (4) and the government budget constraint (3) we
know that the growth rate of all variables is the same.5 If the tax rate is constant,  t =  ;
the fraction of government spending devoted to military spending is also constant, t = ; the
whole model collapses to an AK model, as developed in Barro (1990). In that case the growth
rate is maximized when the tax rate is set to
max = "+ 
and the fraction of government spending destined to military spending is
max =
(1  )
"+ (1  ) :
This implies that the fraction of military spending in gross domestic product (GDP) that
maximizes the growth rate is 
mt
yt
max
= maxmax = (1  ):
If NATO members are encouraged to converge in their military spending to a given fraction of
their GDPs, we can predict the e¤ects by taking into account their structural parameters.6
Notice that if we rewrite slightly the production function we can observe that the ratio Mt
mt
is an external e¤ect the military alliance has on the economy
yt = Atk
1 " 
t n
"
tm

t

Mt
mt

:
5Given the convergence equation (2), once mt converges to Mt; the external e¤ect will disappear and the
model collapses to Pieroni (2009).
6Function  = T ();  = R() are both concave, i.e.
d
d
> 0 for  < max;
d
d
< 0 for  > max;
d
d
> 0 for  < max;
d
d
< 0 for  > max:
8
The more the national military spending lags behind the alliance one, the stronger should be
the alliance pull. Rewriting the growth rate using the relative military spending we get
t =



(1  "  ) (1   t+1) 
"+
1 " 
t+1 A
1
1 " 
t+1 (7)
 
1  t+1
 "
1 " 
 
t+1
+("+)
1 " 

Mt+1
mt+1
("+)
1 " 
+ 1  
#) 1

:
The growth rate of consumption can thus be expressed as a function of the external e¤ect, tax
rate, fraction of government spending devoted to non-military and military spending and the
structural parameters of the economy.
Setting  = 0 we get a version of the model of Pieroni (2009), a model for a country which
is not a member of an alliance. In this case the national security would be just a function of
national military spending
snon-membert = Btmt:
3.1 Equilibrium behaviour
We have two e¤ects playing against each other in this model. The military alliance membership
and the compliance increases the fraction of government spending devoted to military spending,
t: If 
max and max were employed before the country becomes a member of a military alliance,
the convergence to the required standards would induce negative e¤ect on growth. On the other
hand, the military alliance membership provides higher security and stability. This positive
e¤ect on growth is expressed as a spillover in the production function.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Methodology
According to the conclusions of the model, the relationship between defence spending and
economic growth would be a¤ected by belonging to a military alliance and the commitments
linked to membership. Further, the model suggests a positive e¤ect associated to the increased
e¢ ciency related to security and stability and a negative e¤ect provided the defence spending
increases above the optimal level due to alliance commitments, being this e¤ect larger the
more the country lags behind. Following equation (7) of the model, the growth rate of the
economy will depend on military spending and its relationship with the rest of the public
expenditure, on the fact of belonging or not to a military alliance and the e¤ects it may have
on the e¢ ciency of the defence sector. The initial analysis is based on a dynamic panel data
set of 64 countries over the 1950-2014 period. All the countries included are involved in one
of the relationships with NATO, described in section 2, along the period of study. Similar to
previous papers on defence spending and economic growth such as Yakovlev (2007), Compton
and Paterson (2016) and Musayev (2016), we construct non-overlapping intervals to analyse
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the e¤ects of military spending on growth which reduce biases stemming from reverse causation
(Beck, 2008). In particular, we use three-year intervals. This procedure has the advantage that
short-run cyclical uctuations can be ltered out as well (Clements et al., 2003 and Aghion
et al., 2009) and time horizon is not too much reduced. Similarly, Presbitero (2006) and Di
Liberto et al. (2008) among others, have used this three-year interval approach. Accordingly,
there are twenty two intervals in the period analysed. Therefore, the baseline specication to
estimate is
Yit = 0 + 1GDPcapit 1 + 2 Nonmilit + 3 Milit + 4 Allianceit +  Xit + t + it (8)
where for country i and period t, Yit is the three-year average log di¤erence of real GDP,
GDPcapit 1 is the logarithm of real GDP per capita at the beginning of the period, Nonmilit is
the logarithm of non-military spending (government consumption and investment) to GDP, t
are country xed e¤ects and it is the error term.
Variable Milit accounts for military expenditure and is computed as the three-year average
of the logarithm of military spending to GDP. Variable Xit accounts for control variables tradi-
tionally used in the literature: population growth (PopGrowth) and education (Schooling),
measured at the beginning of the period. Economic variables and population data come
from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 9.0. Defence spending comes from Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database and education, measured as the average
years of schooling attained by total population aged 15 and over, come from Barro and Lee
(2013). Variable Allianceit accounts for the e¤ects associated to the relationship with the
military alliance. Three di¤erent measures are introduced, namely NATO, NATO_benefit and
NATO_benefit_from_partnership.
As explained above, the integration into NATO can be interpreted as a continuous process
that has di¤erent phases: from the Dialogue phase to the implementation of the Membership
Action Plan and the membership status. In each phase, countries are supposed to increase
their partnership commitment with the alliance and approach NATO institutional arrange-
ments and military procedures. Along the analysed period many countries have decided to
become members while others have just reinforced their relationships. Accordingly, NATO vari-
able is dened to capture the di¤erent country evolution and relation to NATO. It presents an
increasing relationship to NATO membership. In particular, it has the lowest values in early
stages of relationships (Dialogue) and the largest value when membership is granted. It repre-
sents the institutional arrangements accepted in the relation with the alliance. NATO_benefit,
instead, is a proxy for the security benets associated to the common defence spending and
the collective action established in NATO treaty. For country i, we compute the ratio between
the NATO per capita defence spending and the national per capita defence spending. Values
greater than 1 indicate that country i is far from the alliance expenditure. Additionally, we
dene NATO_benefit_from_partnership to account for the security benets linked to partner-
ship. For country i, we compute the ratio between the per capita defence spending of NATO
partners and the national per capita defence spending. Values greater than 1 indicate that
country i is far from the partners, that is, has a lower defence spending. Furthermore, during
our period of analysis there have been important changes in the international strategic scenario.
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NATO denes seven di¤erent key events that have shaped its evolution.7 Accordingly, seven
dummy variables are dened to control for these circumstances and introduced in the regression
analysis. Table 1 collects summary statistics of the data used.
[insert Table 1 here]
We estimate equation (8) using system GMM dynamic panel data estimator. Traditionally
GMM uses rst-di¤erence transformation. However, this technique has a weakness. It magnies
gaps in unbalanced panels (Roodman, 2009). Arellano and Bover (1995) propose a second
transformation orthogonal deviationsthat minimizes data loss and since lagged observations
do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments. Since the sample is small, we decide
to use this transformation in order to preserve sample size. Further, to avoid over-tting, we
collapse the instrument matrix.8 ;9 From the time series analysis point of view some problems
may arise because data may be non-stationary. As a consequence, that would give rise to
co-integration analysis and specication of an error-correction model. We perform a battery
of panel unit root tests.10 Table A.1 in Appendix collects the results. Individual unit root
processes are rejected for GDP per capita (GDPcap), GDP growth (Y), defence spending
over GDP (Mil) and NATO_benefit_from_partnership. Results are inconclusive for NATO
and NATO_benefit and depend on the test performed. Therefore, we do not nd evidence of
non-stationarity in our sample.
5 Results
Table 2 shows estimation results. Hansens tests for all specications indicate the validity of
the set of instruments chosen and that they are exogenous.
[insert Table 2 around here]
Column 1 presents the baseline specication. Initial GDP (GDPcapit 1) has a negative
and signicant coe¢ cient. This result is consistent with previous studies on economic growth
and convergence. Investment coe¢ cient is positive and signicant as expected. Education
7These events correspond to: birth of NATO (1949), fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), NATO development of
partnerships with former adversaries (1991), Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis (1995), terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington (2001), NATO command of International Security Assistant Force in Afghanistan (2003 ), NATO
adoption of "Active Engagement, Modern Defence" (2010 ).
8We have chosen not to run two-step GMM due to well-known nite sample problems associated with the
standard errors of two-step estimates. Indeed, two-step estimates of the model (not reported) suggest signicant
downward bias in the standard errors, even after using the Windmeijer (2005) correction.
9Following previous literature (see Compton and Paterson, 2016, among others) stock variables are treated
as predetermined and the rest are considered endogenous.
10The tests performed are the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP). The number of lags is chosen such that the AIC for the regression is minimized. This process is
done for each panel so that di¤erent panels may use di¤erent numbers of lags.
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(Schooling) and Population growth (PopGrowth) do not present signicant e¤ects in our sam-
ple. These results maintain in all specications. Civilian government spending presents a neg-
ative coe¢ cient, but it is only signicant when NATO_benefit_from_partnership is included
in the regression (columns 6-7).
Looking at the variable of interest, military spending is not signicant in any of the runs.
In column 2 variable NATO that accounts for the degree of intenseness of the relation with the
alliance is introduced. It presents a positive and signicant coe¢ cient. Therefore, the prospect
of becoming a NATO member or intensifying partnership has a positive e¤ect on economic
growth. It can be considered as a positive shock for improving armed forces, increasing trans-
parency and support reform to be more e¢ cient. In columns 3 and 4 we introduce the benet
associated to increase security, being a NATO member or a NATO partner (NATO_benefit,
NATO_benefit_from_partnership). Both variables have positive and signicant coe¢ cients
suggesting that the increased security and stability associated with the relationship with the
alliance promotes economic growth. This result suggests that countries could have greater eco-
nomic welfare by making their defence spending more similar to alliance standards. In column
5 to 7 we introduce an interaction term between defence spending over GDP and NATO vari-
ables. Results for initial GDP and investment maintain. Now the coe¢ cient of government
consumption is negative and signicant suggesting a detrimental e¤ect on economic growth.
NATO variablescoe¢ cients continue to be positive and signicant. However, the interaction
term is negative and signicant. Hence, the positive e¤ect of belonging to NATO institutional
arrangements and enjoying the possibility of collective action is less relevant in countries with
higher national defence spending. This result is in line with model predictions of a di¤erential ef-
fect according to national defence spending. Looking at diagnostic tests, the over-identication
tests support the specication chosen and regarding the tests of autocorrelation AR (1) and
AR (2), the null hypothesis (of no autocorrelation) is accepted at 5% for all runs.11
Next, we analyse separately the e¤ects of NATO in countries with high and low defence
spending. Results are presented in Table 3. Defence spending is not signicant for high spenders
as in the whole sample and Alliance variables do not signicantly a¤ect economic growth
(columns 1 and 2). Further, the interaction term is only signicant when we introduce the
NATO_benefit variable presenting a negative coe¢ cient (column 4). In general terms, results
for this subsample are weaker than for the whole sample. Evidence for the countries with
low defence spending is stronger. First, defence spending a¤ects positively and signicantly
economic growth and so Alliance variables do. In this case, the interaction variable is not
signicant in any of the specications. These results indicate nonlinearities in the defence and
economic growth nexus as well as the relationship between belonging to a military alliance and
growth. This result is in line with the conclusions of the model that suggests greater impact
for those countries that lag behind defence spending.
[insert Table 3 around here]
11P-values around 0.8 except for last column.
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5.1 Robustness Analysis
We have shown that results are not a¤ected by alternative Alliance variable denitions but are
dependent on national defence spending level. As explained above, there is also evidence of a
positive e¤ect of defence spending associated to less developed countries (Alpekin and Levine,
2012). Further, results could be impacted by the conicts in which countries are involved
(Aizenman and Glick, 2006) or the fact that a country is closer to areas in conict. Finally,
USA is considered to be the leader of the alliance and its current administration has complained
about the poor commitment of their allies. Therefore, we run four additional checks. First, we
divide the sample between more and less developed countries. Second, we introduce a control
for the number of conicts, third we include a geographical control and nally we carry out the
analysis without USA.12 ;13
Results for the separated analysis of developed and less developed countries are presented in
Table 4. As shown for the countries with higher defence spending, developed countries present
mild results: defence spending is not signicant and Alliance variables do not signicantly
a¤ect economic growth (columns 1 and 2). Further, the interaction terms are not signicant
either. Interestingly, the convergence e¤ect maintains and the education proxy spurs economic
growth. Evidence for less developed countries is stronger. First, defence spending a¤ects posi-
tively and signicantly economic growth. This result is in line with the meta-analysis of Alpekin
and Levine (2012). Further, being a NATO partner has positive e¤ects on growth. However,
the benets of collective defence institutional agreement do not signicantly a¤ect economic
growth. In this case, as with developed economies, interaction variable is not signicant in any
of the specications.
[insert Table 4 around here]
Table 5 presents the results when the conicts and geography are taken into account. Results
are not a¤ected by the inclusion of these new control variables. Table 6 shows the e¤ects when
USA is taken out of the analysis. Conclusions mimic the ones presented for the whole sample
suggesting that the results are not driven by USA. To end up with the robustness analysis we
have repeated the analysis using ve-year intervals as in similar studies on defence economic
growth nexus with the correspondent reduction in the number of observations. Results are not
altered either (Table 7).
[insert Table 5 around here]
[insert Table 6 around here]
[insert Table 7 around here]
12Conict data come from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset version 4-2009. The rst release is described
in Gleditsch et al. (2002).
13Geographical control groups countries into ve geographical categories. To construct this control we take
into account the number of conicts (similar to the region variable in the UCDP/PRIO conict database) and
the relationships with NATO. The categories are region 0 (Europe), region 1 (America), region 2 (Australia),
region 3 (Asia) and region 4 (Africa).
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Therefore, the belonging or having a special partnership with a military alliance has positive
e¤ects on growth with independence of the measure introduced, the subsample analysed, the
inclusion of additional controls, di¤erent period size and the exclusion of the USA.
6 Conclusions
We present a general equilibrium endogenous growth model that allows us to study the defence
spending and growth relationship in a country engaged in military cooperation. Common
defence policy improves security and welfare. It may also change the level of public funds
devoted to defence spending and therefore, a¤ect the level of output. The nal e¤ect will
depend both on its initial defence spending and on the external e¤ect exerted by the alliance
on the economy.
The empirical analysis is carried out for the particular case of NATO during the period
1950-2014. Results conrm that the prospect of more intensive cooperation with the alliance
and increased security has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. This fact clearly reinforces the
role of alliance membership. Our results are robust to alternative variable denitions, di¤erent
subsamples, introduction of additional controls and non-stationarity issues.
Future research on public spending should take into account this additional evidence on
the relationship between defence spending and economic growth. The ndings suggest that the
intensive adaptation of countriesdefence strategy and procedures to relatively higher standards
may improve economic conditions. Current results conrm the relevance of the new institutional
environment and security transformation called for by the NATO.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the relationship between NATO and its partners/membres 
 
 
 
Note: Dialogue accounts for political dialogue; PfP is Partnership for Peace program; PfP P 
accounts for PARP (PArtnership for peace program planning and Review Process); IPAP is 
Individual Partnership Action Plan, Int Dia means intensive dialogue previous to Membership 
Action Plan (MAP); MEM means MEMbership. 
Previous Members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, United States, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, Germany, 
Spain. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita growth 969 0.0276 0.0585 -0.4138 0.5356 
GDP per capita (log) 969 9.3347 1.0154 5.5468 11.8918 
Military Expenditure 
over GDP 967 0.0311 0.0321 0.0005 0.4384 
Public Investment over 
GDP 969 0.2266 0.0769 0.0284 0.4988 
Public Consumption over 
GDP 969 0.2021 0.0926 0.0284 0.6381 
NATO 969 0.4638 0.4527 0.0000 1.0000 
NATO_benefit 969 0.7229 1.3845 0.0000 18.2811 
NATO_partner benefit 969 1.6489 3.6347 0.0000 57.8162 
Population Growth 969 0.4904 1.1364 -1.2054 7.5875 
Schooling (log) 919 2.1351 0.4179 0.3229 2.6520 
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Table 2: Military Spending, NATO and growth 
      
Dependent var: GDP per 
Cap (log) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ini GDP (percap) -0.0227*** -0.0392*** -0.0286** -0.0180** -0.0259* -0.0288*** -0.0160* 
 (0.0088) (0.0157) (0.0080) (0.0092) (0.0137) (0.0078) (0.0092) 
Investment/GDP 0.1870** 0.1223 0.1544* 0.1861** 0.1974* 0.1824* 0.1833** 
 (0.0894) (0.1064) (0.0892) (0.0889) (0.1168) (0.0966) (0.0934) 
Gov.Consumption/GDP -0.1244 -0.0624 -0.1843** -0.1283* -0.0777 -0.1722* -0.1682** 
 (0.0935) (0.0786) (0.0907) (0.0755) (0.0745) (0.0919) (0.0850) 
Mil.Expenditure/GDP -0.0003 -0.0056 0.0039 0.0042 0.0067 0.0068 0.0148 
 (0.0093) (0.7171) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0113) 
NATO  0.1018**   0.0967**   
  (0.0270)   (0.0472)   
NATO_benefit   0.0073*   0.0074*  
   (0.0039)   (0.0099)  
NATO_partner 
benefit    
 
0.0094** 
  
 
0.0081* 
    (0.0043)   (0.0046) 
NATO*MilExp/GDP     -0.0810**   
     (0.0392)   
NATO_profit* 
MilExp/GDP      -0.0055  
      (0.0154)  
NATO_benefit_from_ 
partner*MilExp/GDP       
 
-0.0221* 
       (0.0114) 
PopGrowth -0.0115 0.0043 -0.0103 -0.0076 0.0037 -0.0089 -0.0109 
 (0.0082) (0.0071) (0.0106) (0.0059) (0.0078) (0.0113) (0.0071) 
Schooling (log) 0.0083 0.0354 0.0227 0.0033 0.0165 0.0202* -0.0052 
 (0.0264) (0.0243) (0.0211) (0.0249) (0.0296) (0.0220) (0.0289) 
Constant 0.1881 0.2231 0.2434* 0.1662* 0.1933 0.2520*** 0.2195** 
 (0.1167) (0.1534) (0.0978) (0.0985) (0.1301) (0.0946) (0.1115) 
Observations 917 917 917 917 917 917 917 
Specification tests         
AR(1) -2.39*** -2.46*** -2.40*** -2.38*** -2.50*** -2.40*** -2.36*** 
AR(2) 1.82* 1.62 1.82* 1.79* 1.54 1.80* 1.96* 
Hansen tests         
Overidentification 53.06 54.01 53.59 53.03 48.60 52.42 50.40 
Exogeneity (Difference) 0.20 1.34 1.34 -0.28 2.26 0.00 -0.21 
Dependent variable: logged per capita GDP growth. Estimation: system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) 
small sample robust correction. Stock variables are treated as predetermined and the rest are 
considered endogenous. To avoid over-fitting the instrument matrix is collapsed.  All specifications 
include time effects (NATO key events) as defined by NATO. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 3. Military Spending, NATO and growth.  
  Large Spending Low Spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)        (8) 
Initial GDP (per capita) -0.0327 0.0343 -0.0088 -0.0149 -0.0306*** -0.0242* -0.0051 0.0008 
 (0.0335) (0.0359) (0.0629) (0.0308) (0.0099) (0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0128) 
Investment/GDP 0.2511* 0.2178 0.2835 0.1152 -0.0027 -0.0884 -0.0190 -0.0655 
 (0.1344) (0.1523) (0.2183) (0.1896) (0.0984) (0.1372) (0.1259) (0.1698) 
Gov. Consumption/GDP -0.2170 0.1276 -0.0547 0.1090 -0.1448** -0.2321** -0.1725** -0.2448** 
 (0.2913) (0.2031) (0.3298) (0.3390) (0.0377) (0.1083) (0.0861) (0.1017) 
Mil. Expenditure/GDP 0.0231 -0.3503** 0.0072 -0.0154 0.0160* 0.0174* 0.0177** 0.0171* 
 (0.0329) (0.1734) (0.0302) (0.0313) (0.0089) (0.0099) (0.0084) (0.0093) 
NATO -0.0002 0.1346   0.0622*** 0.0558*   
 (0.0373) (0.1101)   (0.0220) (0.0322)   
NATO*Mil. Exp/GDP  -0.1311*    -0.0340   
  (0.0699)    (0.2896)   
NATO_benefit   -0.0060 0.0100   0.0104*** 0.0096*** 
   (0.0237) (0.0240)   (0.0038) (0.0036) 
NATO_benefit*Mil. Exp/GDP    -0.0435*    -0.0124 
    (0.0250)    (0.0129) 
PopGrowth -0.0269 0.0141 0.0008 0.0099 0.0048 0.0034 -0.0022 -0.0117 
 (0.0288) (0.355) (0.0174) (0.0256) (0.0071) (0.0088) (0.0129) (0.0082) 
Schooling (log) 0.0935 -0.0864 0.0154 -0.0130 0.0074 0.0077 -0.0087 -0.0045 
 (0.0849) (0.0885) (0.1165) (0.0956) (0.0163) (0.0261) (0.0201) (0.0211) 
Constant 0.1795 -0.1987 0.0179 0.1082 0.3481*** 0.3423** 0.1873* 0.1605 
 (0.2641) (0.2253) (0.4125) (0.1995) (0.1028) (0.1339) (0.1108) (0.1094) 
Observations 360 360 360 360 557 557 557 557 
AR(1)  -1.68* -1.76* -1.72* -3.89*** -3.86*** -3.89*** -3.68*** -3.67*** 
AR(2)  1.14 0.79 0.92 1.51 1.69* 1.51 1.65 1.62 
Hansen tests         
            Overidentification 15.79 11.84 20.24 38.22 36.69 38.22 40.05 42.23 
            Exogeneity 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 -1.49 1.04 2.29 4.25 
Dependent variable: logged per capita GDP growth. Estimation: system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Stock variables are treated as 
predetermined and the rest are considered endogenous. To avoid over-fitting the instrument matrix is collapsed.  All specifications include time effects (NATO key events) 
as defined by NATO. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 4. Military Spending, NATO and growth.  
  Developed Countries  Less Developed Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)                     (8) 
Initial GDP (per capita) -0.0329** -0.0334** -0.0424* -0.0415* -0.0094 -0.0078 0.0030 0.0118 
 (0.0140) (0.0164) (0.0228) (0.0252) (0.0135) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0162) 
Investment/GDP 0.2154 0.2253 0.1772 0.1806 -0.1618 -0.2040 -0.0716 -0.0809 
 (0.1389) (0.1551) (0.1219) (0.1435) (0.1359) (0.2064) (0.1596) (0.1433) 
Gov. Consumption/GDP -0.2004 -0.1738 -0.2089 -0.1957 -0.1572 -0.1590 -0.1833 -0.1820 
 (0.1959) (0.2218) (0.2607) (0.2986) (0.0993) (0.1366) (0.1264) (0.1172) 
Mil. Expenditure/GDP 0.0024 0.0028 -0.0042 -0.0040 0.0198* 0.0232** 0.0197* 0.0181* 
 (0.0122) (0.0162) (0.0155) (0.0173) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0092) 
NATO -0.0205 -0.0157   0.0488* 0.0608**   
 (0.0187) (0.0244)   (0.0291) (0.0302)   
NATO*Mil. Exp/GDP  -0.0170    -0.0298   
  (0.0399)    (0.0358)   
NATO_benefit   -0.0019 -0.0016   0.0139*** 0.0125*** 
   (0.0049) (0.0057)   (0.0044) (0.0031) 
NATO_benefit*Mil. Exp/GDP    -0.0018    -0.0141 
    (0.0093)    (0.0121) 
PopGrowth -0.0101 -0.0116 -0.0086 -0.0082 -0.0056 -0.0023 -0.0067 -0.0124 
 (0.0114) (0.0138) (0.2607) (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0171) (0.0125) 
Schooling (log) 0.1008* 0.0928 0.1215 0.1169 -0.0039 -0.0073 -0.0317 -0.0395 
 (0.0545) (0.0599) (0.0825) (0.0899) (0.0317) (0.0356) (0.0326) (0.0389) 
Constant 0.1178 0.1446 0.1450 0.1450 0.2352** 0.2470** 0.1717 0.1080 
 (0.1037) (0.1343) (0.1415) (0.1632) (0.1024) (0.1235) (0.1177) (0.0899) 
Observations 499 499 499 499 418 418 418 418 
AR(1)  -1.82* -1.83* -1.85* -1.84* -3.50*** -3.52*** -3.45*** -3.46*** 
AR(2)  0.87 0.83 0.82 0.81 1.59 1.50 1.75* 1.78* 
Hansen tests         
            Overidentification 20.90 30.58 30.49 30.57 26.67 26.42 26.69 22.21 
            Exogeneity 0.00 -0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.53 0.15 -0.46 0.00 
Dependent variable: logged per capita GDP growth. Estimation: system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Stock variables are treated as 
predetermined and the rest are considered endogenous. To avoid over-fitting the instrument matrix is collapsed.  All specifications include time effects (nato key events) as 
defined by NATO. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 5. Military Spending, NATO and growth. Additional controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)                   (8) 
Initial GDP (per capita) -0.0439*** -0.009* -0.0152 0.0027 -0.0382** -0.0328* -0.0170* -0.0169* 
 (0.0150) (0.0163) (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0101) (0.0099) 
Investment/GDP 0.1098 0.1713 0.1516 0.1646 0.1182 0.1615 0.1650* 0.2235** 
 (0.1148) (0.1486) (0.0955) (0.1637) (0.1071) (0.1215) (0.0961) (0.1063) 
Gov. Consumption/GDP -0.0581 -0.1049 -0.1315 -0.1119 -0.0716 -0.0832 -0.1206 -0.1148 
 (0.0897) (0.0886) (0.0837) (0.0839) (0.0771) (0.0769) (0.0817) (0.0765) 
Mil. Expenditure/GDP -0.0046 0.0104 0.0053 0.0167 -0.0055 0.0104 0.0051 0.0131 
 (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0115) (0.0149) (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0118) 
NATO 0.1174** 0.0875*   0.0958** 0.1041**   
 (0.0465) (0.0451)   (0.0437) (0.0423)   
NATO*Mil. Exp/GDP  -0.0779*    -0.0757**   
  (0.0386)    (0.0394)   
NATO_benefit   0.0100** 0.0127**   0.0102** 0.0079* 
   (0.0042) (0.0058)   (0.0044) (0.0046) 
NATO_benefit*Mil. Exp/GDP    -0.0300    -0.0247* 
    (0.0193)    (0.0135) 
Number_of_conflicts -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0007     
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0035)     
Geography     -0.0084 -0.0072 -0.0030 -0.0072 
     (0.0222) (0.0219) (0.0128) (0.0210) 
PopGrowth 0.0055 0.0081 -0.0058 -0.0088 0.0035 0.0067 -0.0073 -0.0064 
 (0.0897) (0.0087) (0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0082) (0.0094) (0.0075) (0.0074) 
Schooling (log) 0.0410 0.0234 -0.0014 -0.0210 0.0352 0.0207 -0.0018 -0.0114 
 (0.0260) (0.0323) (0.0276) (0.0058) (0.0226) (0.0334) (0.0272) (0.0308) 
Constant 0.1178 0.2476* 0.1627 0.0783 0.2378 0.2731* 0.1777 0.2215* 
 (0.2586) (0.1506) (0.1057) (0.1100) (0.1641) (0.1592) (0.1183) (0.1223) 
Observations 913 913 913 913 917 917 917 917 
AR(1)  -2.46*** -2.48*** -2.38*** -2.37*** -2.46*** -2.48*** 2.37*** -2.37*** 
AR(2)  1.65 1.48 1.82* 1.64 1.63 1.53 1.79* 1.63 
Hansen tests         
            Overidentification 53.31 46.09 52.08 52.02 53.31 46.75 54.05 50.52 
            Exogeneity -0.13 -0.80 1.92 0.64 1.11 3.90 0.85 1.1 
Dependent variable: logged per capita GDP growth. Estimation: system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Stock variables are treated as 
predetermined and the rest are considered endogenous. To avoid over-fitting the instrument matrix is collapsed.  All specifications include time effects (NATO key events) 
as defined by NATO. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 6. Military Spending, NATO and growth. Sample without USA 
Dependent var: GDP per Cap (log) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial GDP (percap) -0.0402*** -0.0323** -0.0228 -0.0158 -0.0121 -0.0180** 
 
(0.0145) (0.0155) (0.0107) (0.0100) (0.0124) (0.0089) 
Investment/GDP 0.1163 0.1749 0.1346 0.1570 0.2245 0.2515** 
 
(0.1206) (0.1189) (0.0966) (0.0978) (0.1737) (0.1105) 
Gov. Consumption/GDP -0.0710 -0.0927 -0.1073 -0.1393* -0.0564 -0.1130 
 
(0.0897) (0.0664) (0.0680) (0.0810) (0.1030) (0.0690) 
Mil. Expenditure/GDP -0.0068 0.0097 0.0027 0.0049 0.0131 0.0091 
 
(0.0130) (0.0146) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0163) (0.0116) 
NATO 0.1036** 0.1064**     
 
(0.0428) (0.0438)     
NATO_benefit   0.0157  0.0086  
 
  (0.0152)  (0.0120)  
NATO_benefit from 
partnership    0.0106**  0.0070* 
 
   (0.0042)  (0.0043) 
NATO*Mil. 
Expenditure/GDP  -0.0724**     
 
 (0.0316)     
NATO_benefit*Mil. 
Exp/GDP     -0.0398*  
 
    (0.0225)  
NATO_benefit_from_ 
partnership*Mil.Exp/GDP      -0.0052* 
 
     (0.0129) 
PopGrowth 0.0070 0.0064 0.0015 -0.0075 0.0001 -0.0089 
 
(0.0135) (0.0117) (0.0097) (0.0068) (0.0114) (0.0060) 
Schooling (log) 0.0372 0.0206 0.0182 0.0006 -0.0218 -0.0080 
 (0.0234) (0.0302) (0.0283) (0.0256) (0.0341) (0.0274) 
Constant 0.2350 0.2607* 0.1807 0.1684 0.1821 0.2038* 
 (0.1468) (0.1583) (0.1161) (0.1054) (0.1372) (0.1007) 
Observations 895 895 895 895 895 895 
Specification tests        
AR(1) -2.45*** -2.47*** -2.37*** -2.36*** -2.43*** -2.39*** 
AR(2) 1.61 1.53 1.73* 1.74* 1.65 1.66 
Hansen tests        
Overidentification 50.55 43.74 50.78 53.04 49.06 46.62 
Exogeneity (Difference) -1.14 -1.83 -0.97 0.6 0.24 -2.82 
       
Dependent variable: logged per capita GDP growth. Estimation: system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small 
sample robust correction. Stock variables are treated as predetermined and the rest are considered 
endogenous. To avoid over-fitting the instrument matrix is collapsed.  All specifications include time effects 
(NATO key events) as defined by NATO. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, 
** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 7: Military Spending. 5 year period 
      
Dependent var: GDP per 
Cap (log) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial GDP (per 
capita) -0.0495*** -0.0422*** -0.0153 -0.0548*** -0.0396*** -0.0181 
 (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0091) (0.0144) 
Investment/GDP 0.3402*** 0.3494*** 0.4027** 0.3406*** 0.2844*** 0.4497*** 
 (0.1094) (0.1090) (0.1553) (0.1171) (0.1036) (0.1457) 
Gov. 
Consumption/GDP -0.0626 -0.1242 -0.0943 -0.1031 -0.1818 -0.1031 
 (0.1037) (0.0886) (0.0799) (0.1067) (0.1189) (0.0935) 
Mil.Expenditure/GDP 0.5828 0.5895 0.3939 0.6160 0.6216 0.3921 
 (0.4402) (0.4156) (0.3091) (0.5357) (0.4907) (0.3009) 
NATO 0.0968***   0.1226***   
 (0.0287)   (0.0398)   
NATO_benefit  0.0185**   0.0269*  
  (0.0086)   (0.0146)  
NATO_benefit_ 
from_partnership   
 
0.0153** 
  
 
0.0159* 
   (0.0077)   (0.0096) 
NATO*Mil. 
Expenditure/GDP    -0.08507*   
    (0.0303)   
NATO_benefit* 
Mil.Exp/GDP     -0.0149  
     (0.0461)  
NATO_benefit_from_ 
partner.*Mil.Exp/GDP      
 
-0.0068 
      (0.00093) 
PopGrowth 1.1285 0.7802 -0.0449 1.1288 0.5634 0.0166 
 (1.9453) (1.7751) (1.3236) (2.0980) (2..1781) (1.2751) 
Schooling (log) 0.0644 0.0606 -0.0034 0.0729 0.0630 -0.0071 
 (0.0652) (0.0622) (0.0439) (0.0707) (0.0886) (0.0472) 
Constant 0.1958* 0.1796* 0.0652 0.2413* 0.1692 0.0906 
 (0.1085) (0.0975) (0.1552) (0.1458) (0.2110) (0.1764) 
Observations 526 526 526 526 526 526 
Specification tests        
AR(1) -2.08*** -2.07*** -2.21*** -2.50*** -1.34 -1.91* 
AR(2) -0.61 -0.48 -0.84 1.54 -0.79 -0.85 
Hansen tests        
Overidentification 52.5 49.99 47.69 48.60 46.84 47.76 
Exogeneity (Difference) 1.99 1.94 -0.44 2.26 -1.43 -0.65 
Dependent variable: logged per capita GDP growth. Estimation: system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small 
sample robust correction. Stock variables are treated as predetermined and the rest are considered 
endogenous. To avoid over-fitting the instrument matrix is collapsed.  All specifications include time effects 
(NATO key events) as defined by NATO. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, 
** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Appendix: Results of the Panel Unit Root Test 
 
Table A.1: Panel unit root test for key variables 
Variables IPS ADF PP 
GDP per capita growth rate -12.6432*** 338.0801*** 1076.0973*** 
GDP per capita (log) -4.8144*** 218.5333*** 245.8729*** 
Defence spending/GDP  -4.2817*** 324.9972*** 270.5424*** 
NATO -1.0943 161.8372* 150.6842 
NATO_benefit -1.9930** 325.1384*** 101.0752 
NATO_benefit_from_partnership -2.7721*** 249.7275*** 222.6050*** 
Note: IPS is the Im, Pesaran and Shin test, ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and PP is the Phillips-Perron  
test. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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